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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 57 FALL 1982 NUMBER 1
COORDINATION OF STATE AND
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
JACK B. WEINSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The coexistence of state and federal systems accords each per-
son the benefits of dual citizenship while subjecting all individuals
to two sovereignties.1 This dichotomy becomes particularly striking
when considering the state and federal courts, two independent
systems whose interplay often perplexes the citizen as well as the
theorist visualizing the law as an integrated whole. This Article ex-
plores some of the problems in coordinating the state and federal
judicial systems from the perspective of a federal trial judge in a
large metropolitan area. Power to coordinate belongs primarily to
state and federal legislators, executive agencies, and, in the case of
criminal matters, to prosecuting attorneys and police personnel.
Nevertheless, cognizant of their limitations, courts should take
* Chief Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York; B.A.,
Brooklyn College, 1943; LL.B., Columbia University, 1948. This Article is adapted from the
1982 James B. M. McNally Lecture, delivered at St. John's University School of Law on
April 21, 1982. The assistance of Guyora Binder, Assistant Professor of Law, State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo, is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Article III of the Constitution delineates the judicial powers of the United States. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 8, at 19 (1976). Congress is
empowered to imbue such courts as it might establish with these enumerated powers. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1; C. WRIGHT, supra, § 11, at 29. Congress, moreover, has the power to
grant to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in these areas. Id. § 45, at 193; see Note,
Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 509,
509-10 (1957). In the absence of congressional dictates, however, the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts is shared by the courts of the several states. C. WRIGHT, supra, § 45, at 193; see
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962); Claflin v. Houseman, 93
U.S. 130, 136-40 (1877). See generally M. WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS 269 (1949); State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 WM. & MARY L.
Rv. 599, 599 (1981).
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whatever steps possible to ensure that the two systems properly
mesh.
JUDICIAL REFORM AND STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL COUNCILS
In recent years, much progress has been made in streamlining
the New York courts. The work of the Tweed Commission in the
1950's2 and subsequent constitutional and statutory amendments
have increasingly rationalized the New York court structure. Chief
Judges Desmond, Fuld, Breitel and Cooke, Justice McNally, the
bar associations, and such lay groups as the League of Women Vot-
ers and the Committee for Modern Courts have, with many others,
participated in this enterprise. Similar efforts may be noted in
other states.' In some instances, state reforms have been stimu-
lated by the need to conform to higher institutional standards set
forth by the Supreme Court and state appellate courts.4 In addi-
tion, quasi-public groups, such as the National Center for State
2 The New York Temporary Commission on the Courts, chaired by Harrison Tweed,
prepared extensive analyses of the judicial systems of New York and other jurisdictions. J.
WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, at vii-viii (1981). The legisla-
tive and constitutional reforms urged by the commission, see 1955 REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE CouRTs, were aimed at creating a unified court system
in New York State. Weinstein, The Role of the Chief Judge in a Modern System of Justice,
28 Rac. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 291, 292 (1973). The work of the Tweed Commission weighed heav-
ily in the subsequent overhaul of the state judiciary, which culminated in 1962 with the
establishment of a unified court system. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-37.
1 The Illinois General Assembly approved a resolution that put before the electorate a
"Blue Ballot Court Reform Amendment." Pusateri, The Need to Complete Court Reform
in Illinois, 48 CH. B. REc. 108, 108 (1967). Approved in 1962, the reform measure signifi-
cantly revised article VI of the Illinois Constitution. Id.; see ILL. CONST. art. VI. Supporters
of the referendum viewed the amendment as an important step toward simplifying the court
structure, providing for administrative control, adjusting supreme court jurisdiction to new
conditions, and providing more effective appellate court functions. Chandler, The New Ju-
dicial Article for Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 654, 658-63 (1962). The Illinois court reform experi-
ence has been viewed as a model for reform programs in other jurisdictions. Ashman &
Parness, The Concept of a Unifed Court System, 24 DE PAuL L. REv. 1, 19 (1974); see
Comment, Court Reform-Suggested Legislative Action Under the 1962 Constitutional
Amendment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 858, 858 (1964).
" The Supreme Court's role in enunciating criminal justice standards typifies the man-
ner in which federal activity shapes state procedures. Decisions such as Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), announcing new constitutional guidelines for custodial police interroga-
tions, require that many states modify their existing procedures. See Sheran, State Courts
and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 789, 791 (1981). Although
state judges often have been less than receptive to federal influence, it has been suggested
that such federal rulings are necessitated by the states' failure to institute timely reforms on
their own. Id. at 790-91.
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Courts,5 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,8 the Judicial
Administration Division of the American Bar AssociationJ and the
American Law Institute" have contributed to this restructuring.
In the federal arena, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes was
5 Proposed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1971, the National Center for State
Courts was created to provide a central meeting place where state judges could exchange
ideas and develop programs for the improvement of their respective court systems. Located
in Williamsburg, Virginia, the center continues to play an important role in the research,
proposal and implementation of policies designed to improve the administration and man-
agement of courts throughout the country. See NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 1977 AN-
NUAL REPORT 3 (1978).
6 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was first held in
August 1892, and has since met annually to discuss proposals for uniform legislation. NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNi. STATE LAws HANDBOOK 403 (1980). The organization's
constitution states that "[i]t is the object of the National Conference to promote uniformity
in the law among the several states on subjects where uniformity is desirable and practica-
ble." Id. at 404. When a uniform statute is deemed necessary in a particular area of law, the
subject is studied by an appropriate committee, and a draft of the uniform legislation is
drawn. Upon approval by the national conference, the legislation is recommended for pas-
sage by the state legislatures. Id. at 403. The national conference has contributed greatly to
the coordination of state judicial systems by promulgating the Uniform Class Actions Act,
the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, the Uniform Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure Act, and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Id. at 453-54.
7 In an effort to improve the administration of justice in the United States, the Judicial
Administration Division of the American Bar Association sponsors the National College of
the State Judiciary, an institution offering judges an opportunity to improve their skills
through further education and training. Founded in 1963, thousands of judges have bene-
fited from the educational opportunities afforded by the National College. According to
Chief Justice Warren Burger:
The National College of the State Judiciary has made the single most signifi-
cant contribution to th[e] rising trend of continuing education for state judges.
The College provides a major service by orienting new judges to aspects of their
work. This assistance includes the study and exchange of ideas on problems con-
cerning judicial techniques, such as the presiding function, the internal adminis-
tration of a court and the preparation of jury instruction.
Statement of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, at the Judge-Law Professor Interaction Semi-
nar on Judicial Administration (Nov. 8, 1974).
6 Founded in 1923, the American Law Institute undertook to publish a restatement of
the law to assist the legal community in dealing with the complex and uncertain state of
American law. AMERICAN LAW INsTrTUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTrruTE 5Tm ANmvnsARY
15 (2d ed. 1973). According to one commentator, the role envisaged by the institute
was to undertake an exhaustive study of the law of the United States in order to
state that law in ideal terms, which should take account of new social needs and at
the same time form a common pattern for judicial decision, to the end that the
maladjustments of law to contemporary conditions and the evils of the law's diver-
sities might thereby be alleviated.
Yntema, What Should the American Law Institute Do?, 34 MICH. L. REv. 461, 461 (1936).
The Institute, additionally, has developed proposals for facilitating the certification of ques-
tions of law between federal and state courts, and has authored various research projects
such as the "Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts." See
C. McGowAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDicIL PowER m Tm UNTED STATES 60, 69 (1969).
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instrumental in urging judicial streamlining.9 More recently, Chief
Justice Burger has been active in this effort.10 Administratively,
procedurally, and in the scope and organization of its work, the
federal court system is quite different from what it was 50 years
ago when there were less than 300 federal judges. Today, they
number over 800.11 With that numerical growth has come a com-
mensurate change in character, as the federal court system modi-
fied itself to meet the strains of modern litigation in an increas-
ingly complex society while confronting heightened standards of
due process and equality. Among the changes have been the devel-
opment of class actions; 12 the expansion of complex multidistrict
litigation practice; 3 the extension of magistrate jurisdiction;' 4 the
Hughes, Address of the Chief Justice, 12 A.L.I. PROC. 54, 55, 57 (1935). Prior to the
efforts of Chief Justice Hughes, court reform was the topic of Roscoe Pound's presentation,
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." See Roscoe
Pound Kindles the Spark of Reform, 57 A.B.A. J. 348, 348-51 (1971). See generally Kirsch,
A History of Court Administration-The American Experience, 55 JUDICATURE 329, 329-33
(1972). An early work on court reform was drafted by Pound, together with Louis D. Bran-
deis and other eminent legal scholars. The work addressed the "inadequacy of the legal and
judicial system to achieve the purposes for which law and courts exist." Eliot, Storey, Bran-
deis, Rodenbeck & Pound, Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the Administration of Jus-
tice, in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: TEXT AND READINGS 47, 48 (R. Wheeler & H. Whitcomb
eds. 1977). Chief Justice William Howard Taft was also an early proponent of reform mea-
sures in the interest of judicial efficiency. His address before the Chicago Bar Association on
December 27, 1921, included proposals for the appointment of additional district court
judges, plans for the simplification of procedural rules and suggestions for changes in Su-
preme Court jurisdiction. Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (1922).
10 Chief Justice Burger has been an ardent supporter of court reforms. Burger, Report
on the Federal Judicial Branch-1974, 60 A.B.A. J. 1193, 1193-94 (1974); see supra note 7;
infra note 22. In particular, his concern has focused upon the extensive delays which pre-
vent cases from being tried in an expeditious manner. Burger, The Courts on Trial: A Call
for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.A. J. 738, 741, 798 (1958).
" In 1981, there were 826 circuit, district and other federal court judges, representing
5.8 percent of the total personnel in the federal system. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 152, table 19 (1982).
'2 Class action suits, which allow representatives of a class of parties to sue or be sued,
may be brought only if four requirements are satisfied. First, the class must be so large as to
render joinder impracticable. Second, questions of law or fact must exist that are common
to the class. Third, claims or defenses of representative parties must be typical of those of
the class. Finally, the representatives must be able to protect "fairly and adequately the
interests of the class." FED. R. Cir. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). Class actions have proved useful in situa-
tions where large numbers of persons have suffered damage as a result of a single incident.
11 In 1968, Congress provided for the transfer, to a single judicial district, of actions
pending in different courts dealing with common legal issues. Multidistrict Litigation Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)). Congress enacted this procedure in response to the enormous burdens im-
posed upon the courts as a result of the hundreds of electrical equipment antitrust cases
initiated in the early 1960's. See Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
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implementation of research and training programs for judges and
supporting personnel; 15 the strengthening of the United States Ju-
dicial Conference and Circuit Councils;16 the creation of a sophisti-
cated computer system;17 the promulgation of speedy trial rules,18
uniform rules of evidence,1" criminal procedure rules,2 0 and rules of
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 622-28 (1964). The complex rules
and procedures established for such consolidation are supervised by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation. See generally Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Fed-
eral Courts, 40 FORDHkm L. REV. 41, 44-46 (1971); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Con-
duct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1974). The consolidation of
recent actions by the judicial panel suggests that the procedure is "succeeding in its primary
function: preventing a few major disputes from nearly monopolizing the federal judiciary."
Ranii, Speedy Complex Litigation, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 1, 38, col. 1.
'4 See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Acknowledging congressional intent to
expand magistrates' powers, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept litigants' argu-
ments that their claims were unfairly prejudiced by the performance of certain functions by
magistrates. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268 (1976) (" '[t]he [Federal Magis-
trates] Act grew from Congress' recognition that a multitude of new statutes and regulations
had created an avalanche of additional work for the district courts which could be per-
formed only by multiplying the number of judges or giving judges additional assistance' ").
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(1)-(4) (1976). In 1978, approximately 5,000 judicial personnel,
including judges, magistrates, circuit executives, and clerks, utilized the educational and
training programs of the Federal Judicial Center. FEDERAL JUDICUL C~m m, 1978 ANNAL
REPORT 41 (1978).
16 The Judicial Conference of the United States, established by statute, is responsible
for analyzing the conditions existing among the federal courts and suggesting improvements
to aid in the administration of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The
Circuit Councils, consisting of judges from a particular circuit together with that circuit's
chief judge, are intended to assist in the development of initiatives aimed at improving judi-
cial administration. The councils have been criticized, however, for being ineffective. See
Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U. Cm. L.
REv. 203, 204 (1970). The contribution of the councils in bringing about necessary reforms
nonetheless may be expected to improve since extensive amendment of their authorizing
statute recently has taken place. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
1 See infra note 59.
iS The inability of the judicial system to try cases swiftly has been a concern of both
the bench and bar. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10. This concern, particularly with
regard to criminal trials, also has been shared by Congress, and is reflected in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CmrM. P. 50(b). The current version of rule 50(b)
contains a reference to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980). See 3 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcic. RuLEs PAMHLT 514 (1982). The
purpose of the Act is "to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring
speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial
.. ." H. R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7401, 7402. Toward this end, the Act enunciates various time limits to be imple-
mented on a staggered basis, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(f), (g) (1976), the ultimate goals of which
are a 30-day limit between arrest and indictment, id. § 3161(b), and a 70-day limit between
the filing of the indictment and the trial, id. § 3161(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
19 The need for uniform rules of evidence was recognized by many commentators early
in this century. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 18, at 1-3. One such commentator described the
1982]
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civil procedure;21 as well as the development of professional judi-
cial administrators.22
law of evidence in the federal courts as "not only inferior but far inferior" to that in the
courts of the fifty states. Wigmore, A Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft-Three
Larger Aspects of the Work Which Requires Further Consideration, 22 A.B.A. J. 811, 813
(1936). Notably, in the case of Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), the Supreme
Court cited the need for uniform rules of evidence in the federal courts. See id. at 486. In
1965, Chief Justice Warren appointed an advisory committee to formulate uniform rules, C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 93, at 458, and on February 5, 1973, the Supreme Court presented
to Congress the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 J. MooPE, supra note 18, at 6. Congress,
however, then passed a statute dictating that such rules would not take effect without con-
gressional approval. See Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, § 2, 87 Stat. 9. After
several changes in the draft approved by the Supreme Court, the Federal Rules of Evidence
were adopted by Congress, and became effective July 1, 1975. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, § 2(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1926; C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 93, at 456. The Federal
Rules of Evidence expressly are intended "to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
FED. R. EviD. 102. Many states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in one form or
another. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
20 In 1940, legislation was adopted that conferred upon the Supreme Court the author-
ity to make rules applicable to criminal cases prior to verdict. See Act of June 29, 1940, ch.
445, § 687-89, 54 Stat. 688 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). On De-
cember 26, 1944, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated, Order of De-
cember 26, 1944, 323 U.S. 821 (1944), and became effective on March 21, 1946, see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 63, at 296-97. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "are in-
tended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay." FED. R. CaiM. P. 2. Notably, the rules have undergone
substantial amendment since their adoption. See generally 2 J. MOORE, supra note 18, at 1.
21 Like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
offer a uniform procedural system, serving to standardize the litigation process and mini-
mize confusion in civil cases. They apply to "all suits of a civil nature" brought in federal
courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The rules provide that "[t]hey shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.; see 2 J. MooR, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.13[1], at 284-86 (2d ed. 1982).
" In an address delivered to the Institute of Judicial Administration on August 12,
1969, Chief Justice Warren Burger called for the creation of "a corps of trained administra-
tos" to alleviate some of the burdens of judicial administration which constitute a great
part of a judge's workload. Burger, Court Administrators-Where Would We Find Them?,
53 JuDICATURE 108, 108 (1969). Congress responded to this need by passing legislation that
authorized the appointment of a circuit executive in each judicial circuit. Act of Jan. 5,
1971, Pub. L. No. 91-647, § 1(a), (f), 84 Stat. 1907 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(e)-(f) (1976)).
Although the statute does not purport to provide a definitive list of responsibilities that the
circuit executive must assume, many administrative duties are suggested, including adminis-
tration of the personnel system and budget of the court of appeals of the circuit, mainte-
nance of a modern accounting system, and collection, compilation, and analysis of statistical
data with a view to the preparation and presentation of reports based upon such informa-
tion. A commentator familiar with the duties of judicial administrators has observed that
the success of an administrative system depends upon the existence of an integrated judicial
system, supervised by a state's highest court. Carrigan, The Functions of State Court Ad-
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
Many of these changes have tended to emphasize the separate
character of the two systems. For example, in the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Evi-
dence, the Supreme Court primarily opted for national uniformity
among the federal courts, rather than federal conformity to state
and local norms.23 While it is true that many states have adopted
all or most of these federal reforms, 24 currently, at least in New
ministrator, 46 JUDICATURE 30, 30 (1962). An effective administrative program, once in oper-
ation, will allow judges more time to decide cases, and gradually provide the administrator
with the expertise necessary to develop new methods of improving judicial efficiency. See
Burger, Deferred Maintenance, 57 A.B.A. J. 425, 428 (1971).
2' Conformity by federal courts to state and local procedure was statutorily mandated
in 1792. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. The statute was described as
one requiring "static conformity," since the courts were to follow the state practice as it
existed on September 29, 1789, regardless of subsequent changes made by the states. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 61, at 289. This system of "static conformity" was later abolished,
however, with the enactment of the Conformity Act of 1872, adopting a "dynamic conform-
ity" to state rules. See Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 4-6, 17 Stat. 197; C. WmGHT, supra
note 1, § 61, at 290; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387,
401-11 (1935). While the Conformity Act was more flexible than its predecessor, its many
exceptions resulted in uncertainties as to when and where procedures should be conformed
to state law. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 61, at 290-91. Many believed that
procedure could be better regulated by the courts than by the legislature. See id. § 62, at
291. Accordingly, pursuant to the Enabling Act passed by Congress in 1934, Act of June 19,
1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)), the
Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302
U.S. 783 (1937). Other arguments asserted for the adoption of such rules include their
favorable effect upon the interstate mobility of judges and practitioners, and the belief by
the bar that uniformity will lead to a better and more predictable administration of justice.
See Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE
L.J. 622, 644-47 (1936); Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen
of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 353, 358-59 (1969). But see Leach, State
Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 HARv. L. Rav. 554, 582 (1930) (uniformity may
result in different decisions on the merits in the state and federal courts). On rulemaking by
the courts, see generally J.B. WEINSTEiN, REFORM OF COURT RuLE-MKING PROCEDURE
(1972).
24 Although the federal court system is only one of more than 50 court systems in the
United States, each with its own procedural system, the pervasiveness of the federal court
system brings lawyers from every state into contact with the federal rules. See Cox & New-
bern, New Civil Procedure: The Court that Came in from the Code, 33 ARK. L. REv. 1, 1-3
(1979). Moreover, approximately 23 states have adopted those rules, with some adjustments
for each state's own individual needs. Id. at 2 n.6; see, e.g., A.A R. Civ. P. (1975 & Supp.
1982); ALAsKA R. Civ. P. (1980); ARIz. R. Cirv. P. (1978); COLO. R. CIv. P. (1981); DEL. CT. R.
tit. 10 (1975 & Supp. 1980); IDAHO R. Civ. P. (1979 & Supp. 1982); IND. CODE tit. 34 (1976);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-201 to -269 (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. (1970 & Supp. 1982); Ma. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14 (1980); MAss. R. Civ. P. (1978 & Supp. 1982); MINN. CT. R. 48, 50 (1979 & Supp.
1982); NEv. R. Civ. P. (1981); N.M. R. Civ. P. (1982); N.D. R. Civ. P. (1974 & Supp. 1981);
OHIO R. Civ. P. (1971 & Supp. 1978); R.L R. Cirv. P. (1970 & Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 15 (1967 & Supp. 1982); TsNN. R. Civ. P. (1981); UTAH R. Crv. P. (1977 &
Supp. 1981); VT. R. Civ. P. (1982); W. VA. R. Cirv. P. (1978 & Supp. 1982). For a comparison
1982]
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York, federal practice is noticeably different from state practice.25
A number of factors, if present, reduce this divergence. Adop-
tion of rules of evidence based upon the federal rules limits the
intersystem discrepancies and, thus, lowers the strain on lawyers
operating in both sets of courts.26 In some instances, federal prac-
of the Federal Rules of Evidence with the rules of individual states, see 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 101[02] (1982); Weinstein, Gleit & Kay, Procedures for
Obtaining Information Before Trial, 35 Tax. L. RED. 481, 484-518 (1957).
25 Under Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge is required to take
judicial notice of adjudicative facts upon request of a party, where the necessary informa-
tion has been furnished to him. FED. R. Evm. 201(d); see 4 L. FRUMER & E. BISKIND,
BENDER'S NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 174.01[3], at 99 (1981). Under New York law, however, it
appears to be within the court's discretion as to whether to take judicial notice of a fact. See
Hunter v. New York, Ontario & W. R.R., 116 N.Y. 615, 621, 23 N.E. 9, 10 (1889); 4 L.
FRUMER & E. BISKIND, supra, § 174.01[3], at 99. Moreover, in New York, the so-called "best
evidence rule," which requires a party to present "the original instrument or explain to the
court's satisfaction why he cannot do so," concerns only evidence in writing. 4 L. FRumER &
E. BISKIND, supra, § 270, at 652. The federal rules have expanded the application of the
"best evidence rule" to include recordings and photographs as well. FED. R. EVID. 1001; 4 L.
FRuMER & E. BISKIND, supra, § 280.02, at 713-14. When the original is lost or unobtainable
and secondary evidence is admissible, the federal rule recognizes no scheme of preference or
"degrees" of secondary evidence. FED. R. EviD. 1004 advisory committee note; 4 L. FRuMER
& E. BISKIND, supra, § 280.04, at 715. Apparently, however, the New York courts sometimes
make such a distinction. See 4 L. FRUMER & E. BiSKIND, supra, § 280.04, at 715. Differences
also exist between the Federal Rules of Evidence and those sections of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules that pertain to evidence. For example, the federal rules contain
more stringent restrictions on the impeachment of testimony by evidence showing a prior
conviction of a crime. Compare FED. R. Evm. 609(a) with N.Y. Cri. PRAc. LAw § 4513
(McKinney 1963). Similarly, while the New York statute requires that prior inconsistent
statements sufficient to impeach a witness' testimony be in writing subscribed to by the
witness or made under oath, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 4514 (McKinney 1963), the federal rules
allow impeachment by such statements "whether written or not," FED. R. Evm. 613(a).
26 A Proposed Code of Evidence has been drafted by the Law Revision Commission, see
N.Y. PROPOSED CODE OF EviD. (1980) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CODE], pursuant to the
New York State Bar Association's petition to the legislature in 1973. The Law Revision
Commission described the effect of the proposed code as substituting "a clear, authoritative,
systematic statement of the law of evidence for the present unsatisfactory state of the law."
Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission Relating to the Codification and Revision of
the Law of Evidence, [1982] N.Y. LAw RED. CoMIa'N REP. 29 re1printed in N.Y. LAW REv.
COMM'N, A CODE oF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEw YORK, at XVII (1982).
A primary concern during the revision process was that the proposed code should con-
form, as much as possible, with the Federal Rules of Evidence, since "lawyers should func-
tion under the same rules of evidence regardless of whether they practice in state or federal
court." Meyer and Farrell, The New York Proposed Code of Evidence: Some Background
and Some Suggestions, 47 BROOKLYN L. RE. 1237, 1238 (1981). But while the original pre-
mise was to base the New York code on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the New York code
differs from the federal rules in several respects, including treatment of preliminary ques-
tions, presumptions, and privileges. See generally Martin, Code of Evidence, N.Y.L.J., May
14, 1982, at 1, col. 1. While the New York legislature currently is treating the bill as a study
bill, legislative action is expected to begin in the 1983 session. See id. at 2, col 1.
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tice explicitly incorporates state procedure, as in the use of state
postjudgment enforcement devices2 7 or in the reliance upon state
long-arm jurisdiction. 28 Some further differences can be elimi-
nated. The Eastern District of New York, for example, recently
adopted a local rule on enforceability of judgments which is
designed to bring its practices into conformity with state prac-
tice.29 Moreover, within each court system, much can be done to
avoid unnecessary discrepancies. For example, the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York should have uniform local rules. Ad-
ditionally, wide divergences between the practices of individual
judges in both state and federal courts confuse the bar and should
be reduced.
Despite the differences in the two judicial systems, it should
be remembered that both courts live in the same jurisprudential
milieu. Their lawyers and judges are trained together at law school,
have a common legal history, and share the same social, political
and economic preconceptions. Looked at from abroad, there is
probably less difference between the federal district court and the
New York State Supreme Court than there is among New York's
Surrogate's, Supreme, and Family Courts. There is also a common
tendency in local federal practice, infrequently memorialized, to
27 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 69(a). Rule 69(a) requires that "[tihe procedure on execution...
shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district
court is held. . . . " Id. It was believed that developing a set of uniform rules regarding
supplementary proceedings would be impractical in view of the diversity of situations en-
countered in the various states. See 7 J. MooR, supra note 21, % 69.03[2]. Moreover, the
provisions in most states regarding supplementary proceedings were considered to be "fairly
adequate." Id. It should be noted, however, that any applicable federal statute controls.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 69(a); see 7 J. MooRE, supra note 21,71 69.04[3]. There are few such applica-
ble statutes. Id.
s See Fan. R. Crv. P. 4(e). Rule 4(e) states:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held
provides (1) for service of a summons... upon a party not an inhabitant of or
found within the state .... service may ... be made under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed in the [state] statute or rule.
Id.
29 Section 5020 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules reads in pertinent part-
"Within ten years after the entry of a judgment the attorney of record or the attorney
named on the docket for the judgment creditor may execute a satisfaction-piece." N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. R. 5020(b) (McKinney 1981). The federal district court for the Eastern District of
New York has adopted a local rule substantially similar to the rule for the New York state
courts. See E.D.N.Y.R. 15. That rule provides that "[s]atisfaction of a money judgment...
shall be entered by the clerk. . . upon the filing of a satisfaction-piece executed. . . if
within ten years of the entry of the judgment or decree." Id.
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follow local state practice.30
Assuming that both systems continue to operate in much their
present form, the question of how the state and federal judiciary
can ameliorate some of the stresses attendant on this multiple op-
eration remains to be answered. One innovation, the organization
of state-federal councils, s" blossomed after Chief Justice Burger
suggested their employment as a method of reducing the tension
created in part by increased federal constitutional safeguards that
affected state judicial and criminal procedures.2 The majority of
30 The consistency of local state and federal practice has been referred to as "local legal
culture." Letter from Director A. Leo Levin to Honorable Jack B. Weinstein (April 27,
1982). An example of informal inventiveness in coordinating state and federal practice may
be seen in the endeavors of the Federal Probation Service, the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
and the Federal Parole Commission to cooperate with state authorities on matters of proba-
tion and parole. Letter from Chief U.S. Probation Officer James F. Haran to Honorable
Jack B. Weinstein (April 27, 1982) (describing the 20 year-old agency policy to conserve
limited resources and avoid unnecessary duplication by sharing information and services for
clients subject to both jurisdictions).
" The concept of the state-federal judicial council emerged from the movement in the
1960's and 1970's toward innovation and reform of the process of judicial administration.
See Winkle, Toward Intersystem Harmony: State-Federal Judicial Councils, 6 JUST. SYs. J.
240, 241 (1981); infra note 32. It was believed that small groups of federal and state judges
could work together to alleviate tensions and to foster cooperation between the two court
systems. See Winkle, supra, at 241. Although the councils are composed almost entirely of
federal and state judges, id. at 244, attorneys and other nonjudicial personnel are sometimes
represented as well, id. at 245; see infra note 33.
Since the authority of the councils is not prescribed by statute or constitution, the indi-
vidual councils have flexibility in deciding their own course of action. See Winkle, supra, at
246-47. The objectives of one such council are:
[T]o improve and expedite the administration of justice between state and federal
courts ... ,to promote and harmonize the relationship between these courts and
to eliminate or minimize any conflicts which may have or could develop from the
operation of the dual system of courts.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Delaware Federal-State Judicial Council, Feb. 23, 1971,
reprinted in Winkle, supra, at 246. Among the issues commonly addressed by such councils
are jurisdictional matters such as habeas corpus applications and diversity litigation, and
administrative issues such as calendar conflicts and jury selection. See Winkle, supra, at
247. See generally infra notes 38-86 and accompanying text.
" In 1970, Chief Justice Burger urged the creation of a state-federal judicial council to
help alleviate the inherent tensions of a bifurcated court system. See Burger, The State of
the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049 (1972). As of 1972, 35 states had created
these councils in accordance with the Chief Justice's suggestion. Winkle, supra note 31, at
242 n.3. Chief Justice Burger was acutely aware of the "complex concurrency" contributing
to the confusion and redundancy characteristic of federalism. See Cover, The Uses of Juris-
dictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639,
646, 649 (1981). Through the establishment of federal-state judicial councils, the Chief Jus-
tice hoped to foster intersystem cooperation and promote public confidence in the judiciary.
See generally Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in
the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. Mm L. Rv.
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states organized such councils, comprised primarily of state and
federal judges.3 3 Unfortunately, most of the councils soon became
dormant. 4
The reason for this rapid rise and fall may have been that too
much was expected of these councils.35 After all, they had no inde-
pendent power to act, but merely could advise the two judicial sys-
tems with respect to modifications of practice, training and possi-
ble legislative or rule changes. Moreover, there was, and should be,
no limitation of constitutional protections simply because a judge's
feelings may be hurt when a writ of habeas corpus or a civil rights
judgment is critical of judicial, executive or legislative decisions
that violate a petitioner's or plaintiff's rights. Limiting substantive
and procedural rights is not within the jurisdiction of state-federal
judicial councils. Nevertheless, the councils were useful in bringing
judges and other judicial personnel together to discuss mutual
problems and thereby avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and
conflicts. A more modest and realistic view of their function may
well lead to their increased viability.
Within the Second Circuit, there has been a resurgence of
these judicial councils. One in Connecticut recently has begun to
meet regularly,3" and the council in Vermont has been active. 7 In
New York, Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, acting for the Second
Circuit, and Chief Judge Lawrence Cooke, acting for New York,
recently have agreed to set up a council of judges to discuss state-
federal justice administration problems. Following the recommen-
175, 215-16 (1980).
3 From 1970 to 1979, 92 percent of the members of federal-state councils were judges.
Winkle, supra note 31, at 244. Only nine councils have included nonjudicial personnel at
any time, and presently, only Mississippi, Missouri and Washington number court adminis-
trators, consultants, law professors or other nonjudicial members in their councils. Id. at
245.
" Though at least 30 councils had been established by 1972, no more than nine re-
mained active by 1980. Id. at 242.
"I While there is no definitive study on why the councils fell dormant, some hypotheses
include the councils' lack of clout with poicymakers, little or no financing, unsustained
leadership, and incorrect judicial perception of the nature and scope of federalism problems.
Id. at 249-51; see Wheeler & Jackson, Judicial Councils and Policy Planning: Continuous
Study and Discontinuous Institutions, 2 JusT. Sys. J. 121 (1976). As of 1980, 70 percent of
the inactive state-federal judicial councils reported that they discontinued meeting because
no significant problems remained. Winkle, supra note 31, at 250 n.15.
"8 The Connecticut council was classified by one commentator as dormant in 1979.
Winkle, supra note 31, at 243.
17 "The Vermont Council has gained the exchange of calendars with priorities set on
the basis of the type of case involved." Id. at 247-48.
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dations of a committee of two state and two federal judges, they
have made the necessary appointments.38
In view of the reorganization of the New York State-Federal
Council, it seems appropriate to reconsider a number of areas in
which judicial initiative respecting cooperation is particularly de-
sirable. The subject is necessarily amorphous, but, nevertheless,
based upon experience in New York and elsewhere, it is suggested
that the following topics may provide a fruitful partial agenda for a
state-federal council.
JURISDICTION
Questions involving joint federal-state jurisdiction seem to be
a fertile area for judicial cooperation. For example, in many federal
civil cases, related actions have been brought in state court. Every
effort must be made to prevent duplication of motions, discovery
and trials with their concomitant unnecessary burdens on both
court systems as well as on lawyers and litigants.3 9 If the individual
calendar systems40 were utilized in state court, a judge of either
system could call the other, and, using a conference call in which
both lawyers could participate, decide which court would abstain.
Moreover, legislation may facilitate transfers of parties or seg-
38 In New York, a federal-state judicial council was established in the early 1970's; its
last known meeting, however, was in 1974. N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1982, at 1, col. 4. Recently, the
council, comprised of six new members, has been reactivated by Chief Judges Feinberg and
Cooke. Id. The six judges are evenly divided between state and federal courts; they hope for
an "exchange of views on matters of mutual interest." Id. Organizational meetings to discuss
the number of members, their terms of office, the method of selecting a chairman, and the
goals of the council have been called. See Report from Judge Hugh R. Jones to Chief Judges
Feinberg and Cooke, Re Proposed State-Federal Judicial Council (Feb. 1982). The judges
comprising the New York federal-state judicial council are the Honorable Sol Wachtler of
the New York Court of Appeals, Honorable Vito Titone of the Appellate Division, Second
Department, Honorable Martin Evans of the Supreme Court of New York County, Honora-
ble Ellsworth Van Graafeiland and Honorable Richard Cardamone of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and Chief Judge Jack Weinstein of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1982, at 1, col.
4. See generally Wheeler & Jackson, supra note 35, at 121.
11 The particularly vexing phenomenon of duplication in the state and federal courts
was described by one commentator as "diachronic redundancy." See Cover, supra note 32,
at 646-49. This problem occurs when the same issues, and especially the same facts, are
decided by state and federal courts in sequence. Id.; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
493 n.35 (1976) (habeas corpus); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (describing rela-
tionship between comity, federalism, and civil rights). See generally Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 549 (1976); Ray v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 414-21, 426-35 (1963); Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200, 204-10 (1950).
," See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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ments of the litigation from one system to the other, since absten-
tion,41 stays,42 and conditional dismissals43 are not always suffi-
cient. It is difficult to imagine a constitutional objection to such a
rational cooperative system. Since it is acceptable to transfer a
case from a federal court in Maine to one in Nebraska on the
ground of convenience," it seems no less acceptable to transfer a
case from federal court to state court for trial and final disposition
if the state court consents. Under commerce clause concepts, fed-
eral legislation enabling such transfers appears valid.45
Federal-state judicial councils also might focus upon any pos-
sible jurisdictional changes in the offing. Any sudden shift in juris-
diction, procedure or relative congestion in either system may im-
pose a sudden and unmanageable burden on the other. Should
41 The doctrine of abstention, as enunciated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941), is that federal courts will defer to state courts in cases containing unclear
issues of state law whose resolution could avoid or substantially modify a federal constitu-
tional question. Id. at 501. One commentator has noted that this may engender unnecessary
delay and that the costs of the Pullman procedure outweigh its benefits, eliminating or at
least diminishing the applicability of the doctrine. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal
Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 683, 698 (1981); Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1153-63
(1974); see Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) (prohibiting federal injunctions
against state proceedings when state action is pending).
42 In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, a stay of federal proceedings is favored by virtue
of two policy considerations, namely, avoidance of waste and the impropriety of a race to
secure res judicata effect. Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently
Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 684, 698 (1960); see Note, Power to Stay
Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J.
978, 979-80 (1950) (stays are customarily ordered on grounds of comity and are to be
favored).
's Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a dismissal may
be permitted by the court "upon such terms and conditions'as the court deems proper."
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). A court may also attach a condition to an involuntary dismissal
granted under a Rule 41(b) motion. See Himalayan Indus. v. Gibson Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 403,
404-05 (9th Cir. 1970); 5 J. MooRE, supra note 21, 41.14[l] n.8.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 140 4(a) (1976).
" Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power...
to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sevetal States .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMIsAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 93-154 (1980). This power to legislate has been broadly construed. As early as
1942, the Supreme Court indicated that any activity "though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); see,
e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 153 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 248, 255 (1964). It is submitted that transfer of pending litigation could
have at least some interstate ramifications, and so be amenable to congressional control.
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federal diversity jurisdiction be abolished,46 for instance, it would
probably be necessary to add at least four New York Supreme
Court Justices and the equivalent of one Appellate Division Jus-
tice, given the high proportion of intermediate appeals in the com-
plex cases that would be shifted.47 In any event, if federal jurisdic-
tion is reduced, state courts would require assistance in predicting
the effects on state dockets. The federal judiciary should be able to
analyze their caseloads and provide the necessary data with rea-
sonable accuracy.
Finally, a number of states have adopted the uniform statute
permitting certification of state law questions by the federal
courts.4 s While this is primarily a diversity jurisdiction problem, it
46 Several recent proposals have been made to abolish or substantially reduce federal
jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., AmRICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 9-22 (1969);
Burger, Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A. J.
504, 506-07 (1977). In making such recommendations, the commentators have noted that
the traditional justifications offered for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, such as the fact
that out-of-state parties might encounter discriminatory treatment in state courts, are no
longer warranted. See H.J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 147-48
(1973); Burger, supra, at 506; Flango & Blair, The Relative Impact of Diversity Cases on
State Trial Courts, 2 ST. CT. J. 20, 20 (Summer 1978).
The primary reason for transferring diversity cases to state courts is to reduce the ever-
increasing federal caseload. Flango & Blair, supra, at 20. It is believed that the additional
cases would be less of a burden on the state courts, since they would be spread over a wider
judicial base. See Burger, supra, at 506; Flango & Blair, supra, at 21. The effect of such a
distribution would, of course, vary from state to state. Flango & Blair, supra, at 23. As yet,
however, no decision has been made on the subject, although Congress is studying the pro-
posed legislation. See Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform: Hearings
on H.R. 1046 & H.R. 2202 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-14
(1982) (statement of Robert J. Sheran, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Minnesota).
'17 A recent study conducted by the National Center for State Courts indicates that the
abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction and the resulting transfer of cases from the federal
to state court system would not affect all states equally but would impose a disproportionate
hardship on some states, specifically Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming. In general, however, the
survey's findings indicate that while the transfer of the cases would add significantly to the
burden of these state courts, which were found to be already overburdened, these cases
"could be handled in most instances without major additions to state judicial resources."
Flango & Blair, supra note 46, at 24 (quoting Minnesota Chief Justice Robert J. Sheran,
1976-77 MINN. ST. CT. REP. 12).
8 The Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction are required to apply state substantive law rather
than federal "general" common law. Id. at 78. To assist the federal courts in ascertaining
the pertinent state law, some states allow the use of the certified question. "The certifying
federal court sends to the state's highest court the question to be answered. The question is
considered and the answer is given." UNIF. CERTIF. QUES. LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 49-50 com-
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also arises in federal question cases.49 A reverse procedure permit-
ting state tribunals to call upon federal courts for advice certainly
would be useful, and does not seem to be doomed by constitutional
objections to advisory opinions50 since a real controversy would be
pending in state court. 9
missioner's prefatory note (1975). The first state to provide for such certification was Flor-
ida. Id. at 50; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1974). Section 1 of the Uniform Act does
not mandate the highest court of the state to answer certified questions. UNIF. CERTIF. QUES.
LAW AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 commissioner's comment (1975); see NLRB v. White Swan, 313
U.S. 23, 27 (1941); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 571 (1939).
49 Federal subject matter jurisdiction is based upon a showing of either diversity of
citizenship or the existence of a substantial federal question. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980). Section 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980). Such cases are normally characterized as those
involving substantial federal questions. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 17. Jurisdiction
based on a federal question may arise over questions regarding the Constitution, a particu-
lar federal statute or regulation, or a treaty. Id.
Section 1332 confers original jurisdiction on the district courts in actions involving con-
troversies between, inter alia, citizens of different states, or citizens of a state and citizens of
a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(2) (1976). Such jurisdiction is limited to dis-
putes involving a requisite jurisdictional amount. Id. § 1332(a). One justification long of-
fered for the existence of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is that out-of-state parties
might face prejudicial treatment in the courts of another state. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
1, § 23, at 85. Recently, however, commentators have proposed an abolition of diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. See supra note 46.
"0 "[Tlhe oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that
federal courts do not give advisory opinions. . . . " C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 12, at 40.
The Supreme Court has noted that "[a]s far back as Marbury v. Madison, this Court held
that judicial power may be exercised only in a case properly before it-a 'case or contro-
versy'. . . not then moot or calling for an advisory opinion." United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974) (citation omitted).
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is defined in article In of the United States Con-
stitution, which limits the federal judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Chief Justice Warren stated:
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two complementary but
somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of the fed-
eral courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form histori-
cally viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part
those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to
the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to
give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-
controversy doctrine.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). No justiciable controversy is presented when the
parties to an action are asking for an advisory opinion. Id. at 95; see United States v. Frue-
hauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 330 (1949);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
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SHARING ATTORNEYS
Lawyers quite frequently find themselves scheduled to appear
in federal and state courts at the same time. Generally, the federal
courts, with their individual calendar systems, 1 can offer firmer
trial dates than state courts. Usually, therefore, state judges work-
ing under a general calendar system5 2 have graciously allowed law-
yers to meet these fixed dates, particularly when the federal trial
involves multiple parties or out-of-state attorneys. Often, however,
the reverse is true. When a federal judge receives a call from a
state judge, particularly in a long-delayed criminal case, asking
that a lawyer be released, every effort generally will be made to do
so. The difficulty with conflicting schedules thus is resolved
through the concern for each other's effectiveness that is shared by
most judges and lawyers.
Respect between state and federal judges, and for the trial
bar, does much to ameliorate what would otherwise be an impossi-
ble situation. Yet, the problems could be exacerbated as crowded
dockets deter judges from exercising discretion to grant adjourn-
ments.5 3 Moreover, currently proposed individual calendar systems
" There are two systems currently employed by the courts to allocate cases among vari-
ous judges. The state courts primarily use a general or master calendar system, see infra
note 52, while the larger federal courts generally use what is known as an individual calen-
dar system. Under the individual calendar system, a case randomly is assigned to a judge at
the time of filing. The judge to whom the assignment is made will then be responsible for
the case until its final disposition. See Committee on Criminal Advocacy, The Individual
Calendar System-A Needed Reform for the New York City Criminal Court, 37 REC. A.B.
CITY N.Y. 2, 5 (1982). "Individual calendar control by federal district court judges appears
to be a key factor in assuring productive use of court time and the prompt trial or other
disposition of criminal cases." Id. at 7 (quoting Fooner, Where the System Breaks Down, in
BLOW THE WHISTLE ON CRIME 121 (W. Seymour, Jr., ed. 1979)).
512 The New York City Criminal Court provides an example of what is known as a gen-
eral or master calendar system. Presently in New York, cases are assigned to calendar parts,
such as arraignment or trial parts. When further action is required, the case is reassigned to
the appropriate part. As a case shifts parts, it also changes judges, thus no single judge will
oversee any given case from beginning to end. See Committee on Criminal Advocacy, supra
note 51, at 2-3. This system frequently is faulted for its absence of focused responsibility,
for the "cases belong to the part, not the judge . . . . " Id. at 3. "In addition, judges are
constantly called upon to make snap decisions about unfamiliar cases, which [are] then
passed on to new judges who are equally unfamiliar with the history of the cases." Id. More-
over, at least one commentator has suggested that current delays in civil trials may be sub-
stantially reduced by substituting an individual calendar system for present master systems.
T. CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED 73 (1978).
83 The volume of litigation pending in the courts has exploded over the past decades.
See Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). For example, in the
period from 1940 to 1981, the number of civil case filings in the federal district courts rose
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for state judges, 4 designed to increase both the quality and quan-
tity of dispositions, arguably will increase schedule conflicts as
well.5 In effect, hundreds of state and federal judges would be set-
ting trials calling on the services of a limited trial bar. Working out
reasonable solutions for such impasses should be a primary goal for
federal-state judicial councils.
Another area in which both the federal and state systems com-
pete for the same trial advocates is pro bono voluntarism. In the
Eastern District of New York, a great deal of effort has been de-
voted to developing pro bono panels in civil cases. 6 Some method
from approximately 35,000 to 180,000 annually, resulting in a doubling of the yearly
caseload per judge, from 190 to 350 cases. Id. at 275. Similarly, filings in the state trial
courts from 1967 to 1976 increased at approximately double the rate of population growth.
Id.
See supra notes 51-52.
" Taking issue with the notion that individual calendar systems promote schedule con-
flicts, proponents of the individual calendar approach argue that under the general calendar
system, schedule conflicts are already numerous, suggesting that scheduling problems are
not really linked to any particular case assignment system. Committee on Criminal Advo-
cacy, supra note 51, at 12. Moreover, supporters of the individual system suggest:
[C]ommon sense tells us that schedules conflict when the parties involved have
failed to communicate with each other about their available time. Indeed, under
the master calendar system, there is far less incentive to avoid schedule conflicts
and adjournments since it is commonplace that the judge who agreed to an initial
schedule is not the judge who is asked for an adjournment. In an individual calen-
dar system, an attitude of date certain scheduling would prevail, providing the
impetus for fewer calendar appearances and for better communication between
judges and attorneys as well as the police and other witnesses.
Id.
" The Eastern District Civil Litigation Fund, Inc., was established in 1982 to support
the training and litigation expenses of volunteer attorneys assisting otherwise pro se parties
in civil matters concerning such issues as social security benefits, employment, discrimina-
tion, and civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally BOARD OF JUDGES OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, RULES GOVERNING
PROCEDURES FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEYS IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1982). The fund oversees
the assignment of counsel in these civil cases and sponsors topical training seminars for
participating attorneys. EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CIVIL LITIGATION FUND, INC.,
HANDBOOK ON THE REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT LITIGANTS IN SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRACTICE (1982); Eastern District of New York Civil Litiga-
tion Fund, Inc., Social Security Disability Appeals Conference (May 6, 1982).
While the Supreme Court has announced a constitutional right to counsel in criminal
prosecutions, see, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963), an indigent litigant in a civil case is not usually similarly provided
with legal assistance, see, e.g., Haines v. United States, 453 F.2d 233, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1971);
Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971); Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d 363,
364 (7th Cir. 1970). In a number of cases, however, courts, in their discretion, have ap-
pointed counsel for indigent civil litigants. See, e.g., Massengale v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d
1373, 1374 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1969) (income tax case); Jacox v. Jacox, 43
App. Div. 2d 716, 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (2d Dep't 1974) (matrimonial action).
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of sharing this valuable resource, as well as the criminal defense
bars created by the Criminal Justice Act 57 and Article 18-B of the
New York County Law, 58 is therefore necessary.
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Another area to be considered is the possibility of reducing
administrative difficulties via maximum federal-state cooperation.
The federal record system is in the process of being computerized,
and similar action will be undertaken by New York State. 9 This
A number of commentators have argued that the assignment of counsel to indigent civil
litigants, though not constitutionally guaranteed, is both beneficial and necessary. See, e.g.,
Botein, Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Civil Defendant: A Constitutional Right With-
out a Judicial Remedy?, 36 BRooKLYN L. REV. 368, 368-70 (1970); O'Brien, Why Not Ap-
pointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1967);
Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil
Cases, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 21, 53-54 (1967); Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to
the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 651, 658 (1981); Weinstein, Cost-Cutting and Streamlining
May Deny Justice to the Poor, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2. It has been proposed
that the pro bono work of private practitioners be extended on a compulsory basis. MoDEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Rule 6.1 of the
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this
responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to per-
sons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations, or
by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal
profession.
Id. See generally Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspec-
tives, 2 CARnozo L. REv. 255 (1981); Note, Court Appointment for Attorneys in Civil Cases:
The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 366, 367-72
(1981).
57 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976). The Criminal Justice Act provides, inter alia, that each
United States district court shall place in operation a plan for furnishing representation for
indigents charged with certain designated offenses. Id. Representation under the Act in-
cludes counsel as well as investigative, expert, and other services necessary for an adequate
defense. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 525 F.2d 247, 251 (5th Cir. 1975) (Crimi-
nal Justice Act reflects strong policy to furnish counsel and services to indigents so as to
place such defendants in nearly equal position with defendant who can pay); Tyler v. Lark,
472 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (8th Cir.) (purpose of statute is to protect indigent defendants), cert.
denied, Beilenson v. Treasurer of the United States, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); United States v.
Tate, 419 F.2d 131, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1969) (government compelled under statute to provide
psychiatric evaluation for indigent contemplating defense of temporary insanity).
'8 Article 18-B of the New York County Law provides in part:
The board of supervisors of each county and the governing body of the city in
which the county is wholly contained shall place in operation ... a plan for pro-
viding counsel to persons charged with a crime ... who are financially unable to
obtain counsel. Each plan shall also provide for investigative, expert and other
services necessary for an adequate defense.
N.Y. CoUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1982).
59 See generally Nihan & Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration
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should permit swift interchange of all criminal and civil informa-
tion. It would be helpful if, for example, a judge, state or federal,
could quickly ascertain the number of cases of a specific type
brought by a particular plaintiff, or in which a certain attorney is
serving as counsel, or the length of an average sentence for a given
crime. Storing such information in computerized data banks would
greatly facilitate access to it and would enable a prompt search of
all federal and state records.
Bar membership and discipline provide another area of state-
federal interface. Separate requirements for admission to state and
federal bars are unnecessary since admission to the bar is essen-
tially a state matter.0 A full and appropriate bar examination is
given by the state, and law school courses should be designed to
enable students to act effectively in both systems. In addition, dis-
cipline is, for the most part, a state matter. In virtually no instance
will a lawyer be excluded from the federal court and not the state
system. Since the state has a comprehensive admission and disci-
plinary system, it is common practice to issue an order to show
cause why a lawyer should not be disciplined by the federal court
when he or she was disciplined by the state and, except in a few
cases where the state decision is being challenged, to order the
same discipline concurrently. If a lawyer acts improperly in the
federal court, absent a contempt citation or other sanction under
the federal rules,6' any delict should be handled by the state.
Rather than strike an attorney from the federal rolls, the problem
should be brought to the attention of the state authorities, leaving
to them the primary disciplinary function.
Recent federal attempts to design a wholly new federal admis-
sions and disciplinary system, it is submitted, have been misguided
of Justice in the Federal Courts, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 659, 665.
Technology has three general uses in the courts. First, it can provide manage-
ment and operational support, enabling courts to deal better with the increased
size and complexity of their caseloads. Second, it can speed the execution of rou-
tine tasks and increase the amount of useful information available to a court. Fi-
nally, it can help courts accomplish the research and planning tasks necessary for
the proper administration of justice.
Id. at 661; see Higginbotham, The Trial Backlog and Computer Analysis, 44 F.R.D. 104,
106-10 (1968) (discussion of advantages of computer use in court systems); Whittaker &
McDermott, Computer Technology in an Appellate Court, 54 JUDICATURE 73, 73 (1970)
(feasibility of a court of appeals using a computer to increase efficiency).
11 In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., concurring), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1038 (1975).
61 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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as a matter of policy. 2 Judicial activity for its own sake is particu-
larly undesirable in light of the scarcity of judicial resources within
both systems. Duplication of state efforts should be avoided as
much as possible.
Another administrative factor deserving attention is jury selec-
tion. The time lost in New York state criminal trials because of
the virtually unrestrained use of voir dire6 3 by lawyers is well
known. 4 The trial bar strongly has resisted the federal system of
questioning by the judge using inquiries suggested by counsel.6 5
Here, as in other areas, the federal and state trial judges can learn
techniques from each other, modifying them as differences in prac-
tice require. For example, some federal judges are currently using
magistrates or law clerks to supervise the jury voir dire while the
62 In 1975, a recommendation was made by the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit
that the Second Circuit district courts adopt rules designed to increase the difficulty of ad-
missions to the federal bar and to improve disciplinary procedure. See Advisory Committee
on Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice, Final Report, 67 F.R.D. 161, 161, 191 (1975).
Some of the proposed rules included an increase in required law school courses and an eval-
uation before a screening committee on admissions. See id. at 167-72. It has been suggested
that such a policy amounts to an unjustified interference with the law school curriculum and
is based on an unreasonable assumption that attorneys in the state courts are less qualified
than those in the federal courts. Weinstein, Proper and Improper Interactions Between
Bench and Law School: Law Student Practice, Law Student Clerkships, and Rules For
Admission to the Federal Bar, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 441, 451, 457 (1976).
1- The National Center for State Courts defines voir dire as "the process by which pro-
spective jurors are examined to determine their suitability to serve on the case at hand. Its
purpose is to uncover prejudices and reveal biases, in the hope that all jurors will be fair and
impartial in judging the defendant." NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE CouRTs, FAcETs OF THE JURY
SYSTEM 22 (1976).
64 See Costantino, Abolish Lawyers' Voir Dire of Juries, 8 LITIGATION 5, 6 (Spring
1982). Judge Costantino of the Eastern District of New York stated:
The state courts consume far more time in voir dire than their federal coun-
terparts. For example, jury selection now consumes one-third of New York City
court time.... During the recent state trial of Jean S. Harris, who was convicted
of murdering Dr. Herman Tarnower, the author of The Scarsdale Diet, the law-
yers questioned 550 possible jurors over three weeks. During those same three
weeks in the U.S. District Court in Brooklyn, I selected three juries and tried a
racketeering case, a narcotics case, and a longshoreman case. I managed to select a
jury acceptable to both the government and the defense in one of the "Abscam"
trials in three hours....
When lawyers rather than judges select juries it is a time-consuming and ex-
pensive procedure.
Id.
65 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(a) and Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) guide
voir dire examination in federal court. Under these rules, the trial judge is granted broad
discretion. For example, under both the civil and criminal rules, the trial court may ex-
amine the panel or permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination.
Costantino, supra note 64, at 5.
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judge handles other cases. Some state judges have allowed the law-
yers to select civil juries without a judge being present. These ideas
merit further joint evaluation, and participation in each other's
training programs could prove useful.
66
It is also apparent that the two systems do not cooperate in
distributing the burden of jury service. Some federal jurors com-
plain that they are called to serve in federal court shortly after
having served in state court, and vice versa. It would be more equi-
table for each system to give credit for recent service in the other.6 7
Further, it appears that the federal juror panels in the Eastern
District, being drawn from voting rolls alone, may not be as repre-
sentative of the population as they are under the state system,
which uses other sources in addition to voter lists. Perhaps one
data base from which to draw both federal and state jurors could
be utilized, thereby saving money and minimizing juror inconven-
ience. Legislation may be required to achieve this result.6 8
Another facet to be considered is the utilization of expert wit-
nesses. New York State has expert medical witness panels.6 9 Yet,
use of these state panels by federal judges sometimes is denied by
the clerk in charge. It seems unreasonable to go to the expense of
creating duplicate panels. Similarly, the increased courtroom use of
statistics augurs the eventual establishment of groups of statistical
"The Federal Court's Circuit Conference in the fall of 1982 will be discussing jury
selection and use. State judges should be welcomed and, in fact, Presiding Justice Milton
Mollen of the First Department has been invited by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York.
" See Winkle, supra note 31, at 248.
"The process of selecting citizens who may serve as jurors in New York is regulated by
the provisions of the New York Judiciary Law. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 501-537 (McKinney
1981 & Supp. 1981-1982). The statute lists several possible sources from which the names
of eligible jurors may be ascertained, including lists of utilities subscribers, motor vehicle
registration lists, voter lists and tax assessment rolls. See id. § 506 (McKinney Supp. 1981-
1982); see also Comment, Challenging the Juror Selection System in New York, 36 ALB. L.
REv. 305, 311-13 (1972). The selection under the New York system is required to be per-
formed randomly. See N.Y. Jun. LAW § 506 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
The federal selection plan also provides for a random selection from either the voter
registration lists or the lists of actual voters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1976). Such a system has
been criticized as being less than representative of the total population. See J. VAN DYKE,
JURY SELECTION PROcEnuREs 24 (1977). The federal courts, however, repeatedly have upheld
the validity of this procedure. See United States v. Huber, 457 F. Supp. 1221, 1231-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Gaona, 445 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
6, See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). For a recent case illustrat-
ing the use of expert medical witness panels, see Virgo v. Bonavilla, 71 App. Div. 2d 1051,
420 N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 1979), afl'd, 49 N.Y.2d 982, 406 N.E.2d 1059, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165
(1980).
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experts to aid the courts.70 Both state and federal courts should
share in this resource if it is created.
There is one administrative issue that causes actual and po-
tential problems but is, most likely, not susceptible of resolution
by state-federal judicial councils. There are differences in the pay,
ancillary benefits and duties of equivalent personnel in the state
and federal systems that may cause intersystem friction. For exam-
ple, federal probation service was at one time less attractive, and
possibly is now more attractive, than state service. Federal and
state reporters' compensation differs.7" Although these factors may
result in employee dissatisfaction or cause a shift in employment
from one system to the other, negotiating wages and other terms of
employment is so complicated already that perhaps this thicket
should be left unexplored by state-federal judicial councils.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The final topic to be examined is the arena of criminal justice.
A number of the problems besetting the courts in this area may be
alleviated, to some extent, by increased state-federal cooperation.
There is growing pressure in this country to incarcerate in-
creasing numbers of felons for lengthier periods of time. Presently,
there are over 350,000 prison inmates in the United States. 2 In
70 Several commentators have noted the increased use of statistics in the courts. See
Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 116, 116-17 (1978); Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 55 IND. L.J. 493, 493 (1980); Curtis & Wilson, The Use of Statistics and Statisticians
in the Litigation Process, 20 JuRIMEmxcs J. 109, 110 (1979). Some commentators attribute
this to "larger numbers of technical disputes involving problems such as air and water quali-
ty, the safety and economics of nuclear generators, the deregulation of natural gas, and the
presence of carcinogenic agents in the workplace and in the kitchen." Brilmayer & Korn-
hauser, supra, at 117.
71 As of July 12, 1982, court reporters in the federal system were receiving salaries rang-
ing from $30,121 to $33,133. State court reporters' salaries range from $26,763 to 35,980. See
Memorandum from Robert C. Heinemann, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Office of Court Ad-
ministration to the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, United States District Court,
Eastern District of New York (July 12, 1982). There are, however, differences in fees earned
from transcripts and in the demands made by federal and state judges, making comparisons
difficult.
72 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported a prison population of 369,009 in this coun-
try in 1981. Court News Roundup, 21 JUDGES' J. 1, 1 (1982). This constituted a record in-
crease of 12.1 percent in the total number of inmates in state and federal institutions. Id.
These figures included an increase of 16 percent in the number of federal prisoners, thus
ending a 3-year decline in the federal prison population. Id. at 46. The figures also indicate
wide variations among the states in the percentage of change. The percentage ranged from a
low of -0.9 percent for Michigan, the only state to show a decline in prison population over
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fact, we now imprison a larger percentage of our population than
any other western nation.73 The states are not building prisons
rapidly enough to handle these increasing numbers.74 In case after
case, the federal courts have intervened to reduce overcrowding in
state jails and prisons, 7s which, in turn, has a direct impact upon
the period studied, to a high of + 24.8 percent for Alabama. Full House in America's Pris-
ons, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 17, 1982, at 17.
73 The American Institute of Criminal Justice has reported that our national rate of
incarceration of 250 people per 100,000 is surpassed only by two industrialized nations,
namely, South Africa (400 per 100,000) and the Soviet Union (391 per 100,000). Rawls, Cri-
ses and Cutbacks Stir Fresh Concerns on Nation's Prisons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1982, at Al,
col. 1, B10, col. 1. A comparison of the incarceration rates in other western nations showed
that the rate in Canada is less than one-half, in Britain less than one-third, and in West
Germany less than one-quarter of the rate in the United States. Id. at B10, col. 2.
74 In June, 1981, it was reported that federal and state prisons were then holding a total
of 320,000 inmates. This figure exceeded the stated total prison capacity by almost 100,000.
Bulging Prisons Bracing for New Disorders, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 8, 1981, at 31.
In that same article it was reported that at least 70 new state facilities were then under
construction and 100 more were in the planning stage. Id.
Obviously one major factor preventing the construction of new facilities is their cost.
The cost of construction has been estimated to be from $30,000 to $100,000 per bed. Pear,
Reagan Panel Asks Aid to State Jails and Sterner Laws, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1981, at Al,
A14, col. 1 ($70,000 for maximum security, $30,000 to $50,000 for medium security); id., Apr.
23, 1982, at A26, col. 4 (letter to the Editor from Robert Gangi, Executive Director, Correc-
tional Association of New York) ($90,000 to $100,000 estimate per bed). It has been sug-
gested that the federal government provide financial assistance to the states for the purpose
of constructing new facilities. The United States Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime recommended in its final report that the federal government make some $2 billion
available to the states for construction of prison facilities. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME 10, 19-20 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REP.].
One of President Reagan's top advisers, Edwin Meese III, has conceded, however, that the
federal government cannot afford to follow this recommendation. Rawls, supra note 73, at
B10, col. 1.
In contrast to the Attorney General's task force, the American Bar Association's task
force on crime is reported to have concluded that building new prisons will not help reduce
violent crime. Lauter, ABA Crime Unit Backs Pretrial Jail, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 7,
col. 1. "The ABA group said that building new prisons should be a low priority in most
states, which should concentrate more on finding alternative ways of handling non-violent
offenders." Id. at 7, col. 4. It has also been suggested that the basic problem is not money
but rather the unwillingness of the people to accept prisons in their neighborhoods. McQuis-
ton, Why Jail Crowding is So Hard to Cure, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1982, § 21, at 1. For a
general discussion of the problem of prison overcrowding, see Lieber, The American Prison:
A Tinderbox, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
"5 At the end of 1980, a total of 28 states and the District of Columbia were ordered by
federal courts to reduce the overcrowding in their correctional facilities. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1980, at 1 (1981). By the end of 1981, there were 31 states under
such orders, and 37 states in litigation concerning prison conditions. Court News Roundup,
supra note 72, at 1. This judicial intervention persists despite the holding of the Supreme
Court that the housing of two prisoners in a single cell in an Ohio correctional facility did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for purposes of the eighth and fourteenth
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state court bail, sentencing and parole practices. The solution to
this problem does not lie with state and federal judges alone. State
judges and parole boards are caught betvceen the federal judiciary's
mandates to reduce overcrowding and the state legislators' failure
to allocate funds. Federal army bases, old civil and conservation
corps camps, and other facilities could be made available to meet
the states' needs in this area, particularly when juvenile offenders
are involved.76
When prisoners are convicted in both state and federal court,
joint sentencing problems may arise. The federal judge who
sentences after a state sentence is imposed can recommend to the
United States Attorney General that the sentence be served in the
state system, if he wishes the sentences to run concurrently. 7 He
amendments. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1981). As recently as December 23,
1981, New York State's motion for a delay of a federal judge's order to remove 550 prisoners
from the Rikers Island House of Detention for Men was denied. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1981, at
1, col. 1.
76 In its final report, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime made the
following recommendation:
The Attorney General should work with the appropriate governmental authorities
to make available, as needed and where feasible, abandoned military bases for use
by states and localities as correctional facilities on an interim and emergency basis
only. Further, the Attorney General should work with the appropriate governmen-
tal authorities to make available, as needed and where feasible, federal property
for use by states and localities as sites for correctional facilities.
FINAL REP., supra note 74, at 10 (footnote omitted). A recent Gallup Poll indicates that 76
percent of the American people favored the Reagan administration's proposal to permit
states to use abandoned military bases to house their prisoners. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1982,
at A18, col. 3. The State of New Jersey already has arranged to lease the former stockade at
Fort Dix from the federal government. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1982, at B1O, col. 3. The new
facility will accommodate a total of 500 prisoners presently housed in overcrowded county
jails. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1982, at B2, col. 5.
7 Two sections of Title 18 of the United States Code have been interpreted as preclud-
ing a federal judge from ordering that a federal sentence be served concurrently with a state
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3568, 4082 (1976). The relevant part of section 4082(a) provides:
A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be committed, for
such term of imprisonment as the *court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney
General of the United States, who shall designate the place of confinement where
the sentence shall be served.
18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1976). This statute clearly gives the United States Attorney General,
and not the federal judge, authority to determine where a particular sentence will be served.
It has also been interpreted as indirectly denying the federal judge power to order that a
federal sentence be served concurrently with a previously imposed state sentence. See
United States v. McIntyre, 271 F. Supp. 991, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 859 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1054 (1969). The McIntyre court stated:
It is fundamental law that under 18 U.S.C. § 4082 the Court has no power to order
a Federal sentence to run concurrently with a prior State sentence since this in
effect would be a designation of the place of confinement, a matter exclusively
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cannot, however, extend the prisoner's time in the state peniten-
tiary, nor can he designate service of both sentences in his own
system. A state judge may take a prior federal sentence into ac-
count in sentencing on a state charge, but he cannot recommend
service of the state sentence in a federal institution.8 Counsel in
the two cases are often different, and the defendant may not be
fully and fairly treated in either. Joint sentencing by state and fed-
eral judges, perhaps after consultation with one another, some-
times would be more satisfactory. Coordination of correctional and
parole decisions obviously would aid in this regard.
Another area that would profit from judicial cooperation
would be probation services. When both state and federal authori-
ties have jurisdiction over the same prisoner, the probation and
parole authorities of each are called upon to perform similar
tasks.7e The two systems should share probation reports in order to
within the province of the Attorney General. The sentencing Court is only author-
ized to recommend a place of detention which the Attorney General is free to
accept or reject. And while the Attorney General, in practice, generally follows the
recommendation of the Court, he is under no duty to do so. Thus ... a grant of
concurrency (arising from the designation of place of sentence) is a matter of grace
rather than a matter of right. It arises from the combination of the sentencing
judge's recommendation and the Attorney General's adherence to that judge's
suggestion.
271 F. Supp. at 999-1000 (citations omitted); accord United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983,
987 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[alIthough the Attorney General may 'designate as a place of confine-
ment any available, suitable, and appropriate institution or facility, whether maintained by
the Federal Government or otherwise,' 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b), a federal court has no authority
to designate 'a place of confinement'"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 (1975); Joslin v. Moseley,
420 F.2d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 1969).
This same conclusion, that a federal judge does not have the power to order concur-
rency between a federal and state sentence, also has been reached on the basis of section
3568. That section provides:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall com-
mence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary,
reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence .... No sentence shall prescribe
any other method of computing the term.
18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976). In United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1979), the court
held, on the basis of this statute, that the district court had not been empowered to order
that the federal sentence be served concurrently with one previously imposed by the state.
Id. at 185.
78 Saulsbury v. United States, 591 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 857
(1979).
7' In general, a judge may place an offender on some form of probation in lieu of impo-
sition of incarceration. See generally Sentencing, Parole and Probation, 70 GEO. L.J. 721,
763-70 (1981). A crucial factor in such a decision is the input received from probation ser-
vices. See R. HENNINGSEN, PROBATION AND PAROLE 32 (1981). Aside from supervising the
terms of probation, a major role of probation services is the preparation of the presentence
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avoid duplication of research, since the investigative efforts of pro-
bation services in preparing background reports are costly and in-
trusive. There is no need to investigate and describe the same de-
fendant twice. At the moment, the federal probation system in the
Eastern District probably has more high quality resources availa-
ble than the state system, and there is no reason why the state
could not make greater use of the federal reports.80 Certainly,
courts and probation services could frame their orders so that each
probation system could operate as agent for the other in supervi-
sion, training and charging probation violations. The Eastern Dis-
trict Chief Probation Officer has indicated that cooperation with
state probation services already is quite advanced."'
A final area of federal-state interplay in the criminal justice
system is federal civil review of state criminal prosecutions. State
criminal defendants frequently bring collateral attacks on their
criminal arrests or convictions before exhausting their state reme-
dies. When such attacks are leveled, there is the danger that a fed-
eral court will grant discovery in a civil rights suit which would
interfere with the state's pending criminal prosecution.82 These is-
sues are among the most sensitive in the criminal law area.83 Bear
investigation report. See id. at 11. The presentence report contains background information
on the offender, such as his prior record or financial condition, which is designed to enable
the judge to tailor the sentence to the defendant. See id. at 32.
10 Two state-federal judicial councils (Virginia and Maryland) apparently have adopted
programs providing for the exchange of presentence reports between state and federal pro-
bation officers.
8' See supra note 30.
82 It must be borne in mind that interference by a federal court with proceedings in a
state court is violative of the federal abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 43 (1971). In Younger, the Court stated: "Since the beginning of this country's history
Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try
state cases free from interference by federal courts." Id. This same policy of noninterfer-
ence with state proceedings is the basis of the exhaustion doctrine in the area of federal
habeas corpus. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
emphasized:
As it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district
court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts
to correct a constitutional violation, the federal courts sought a means to avoid
such collisions. Solution was found in the doctrine of comity between courts, a
doctrine which teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly
within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent pow-
ers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon
the matter.
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (footnote omitted).
83 See Note, Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims: Speedy Re-
lease, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B.U.L. REv. 864, 871-72 (1977); see also Hopkins,
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in mind that, in the recent case of Rose v. Lundy, 4 the Supreme
Court, in its desire to reduce the repetition of habeas corpus at-
tacks upon state convictions, perhaps went too far by adopting a
total exhaustion rule.85 Petitioners now are required to exhaust all
state claims in a petition before those already exhausted can be.
considered by the federal court. In many cases, rather than sending
the prisoner back to the state to exhaust a plainly nonmeritorious
claim, it might save the time of both court systems if the federal
court were to resolve all issues at once. Justice Hopkins has sug-
gested the establishment of a data bank which would keep the
records of the prisoner's various petitions available to assist both
state and federal judges in dealing with collateral attacks upon
convictions." He concluded that "the possibility of tension be-
Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tension Between State and Federal Courts, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 660, 665 n.34 (1970) ("an appeal is where one court is asked to show its
contempt for another").
- 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
95 Id. at 1199. The case of Rose v. Lundy involved a mixed petition for habeas corpus,
that is, a petition containing at least one claim as to which the applicant's state remedies
had been exhausted and at least one as to which they had not. The exhaustion rule requires
that each claim be exhausted before it can be considered by a federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) (1976). At the time Rose v. Lundy was decided, there existed a conflict among the
circuits as to whether the exhausted claims presented in a mixed petition should be consid-
ered. The majority of circuits had held that the exhausted claims should be addressed. E.g.,
Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1973); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d
1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969). Two circuits, however, had adopted the more demanding total
exhaustion rule, requiring that the court dismiss all claims presented in a mixed petition.
See Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Gonzales v. Stone,
546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976). Adopting the more stringent total exhaustion rule, the
Rose v. Lundy Court held: "[B]ecause a total exhaustion rule promotes comity and does not
unreasonably impair the prisoner's right to relief,. . . a district court must dismiss habeas
petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims." 102 S. Ct. at 1205 (footnote
omitted). Notwithstanding the holding in Rose v. Lundy, the precise degree of exhaustion
necessary remains to be seen. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that the
two circuits that already had adopted the total exhaustion rule did allow exceptions. Id. at
1209 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Brennan observed, in an opinion ren-
dered 1 month after Rose v. Lundy, that the Court was already ignoring its own total ex-
haustion rule. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1578 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan remarked that "[iun scarcely a month, the bloom is off the Rose." Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Hopkins, supra note 83, at 671. The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime
recently came to a conclusion similar to that of Justice Hopkins in a report written some 10
years after the Hopkins article. The report states:
Criminal history information is vital to optimum performance of the criminal jus-
tice system. The police need adequate, accurate information for the prevention
and investigation of criminal activity and for the apprehension of criminal offend-
ers; prosecutors and the judiciary need such information for bringing offenders to
justice; courts need additional information to determine appropriate sentences;
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tween the two systems can be lessened by opening the channels of
communication. '87
Undoubtedly, other areas of tension exist. Most can be re-
solved, however, through common courtesy and consideration of
the needs of other judges, lawyers and litigants. As to these mat-
ters, the state-federal judicial council may prove particularly useful
in exposing points of friction and providing methods for greasing
the gears of our judicial systems. A great deal can be accomplished
on a personal level as federal and state judges invite each other to
their conferences and establish closer social and professional
relationships.
CONCLUSION
The American system of justice should be considered, when-
ever possible, as an integrated whole designed to meet the needs of
all the American people. In both the criminal and civil spheres,
states must, and should, continue to handle the overwhelming bulk
of cases. Nevertheless, various methods for effectively utilizing
joint resources can be developed. This may require partial elimina-
tion of the distinction which currently exists between federal and
state courts, and may raise constitutional, legislative, and practical
difficulties. Such methods, however, are well worth investigation
with a view toward creating a cooperative federal-state system of
justice.
The primary responsibility for better coordination rests with
the legislature since it can provide a more rational division of juris-
diction and substantive law. The executive branch, moreover, par-
ticularly prosecutors and police, must cooperate in allocating
prosecutorial roles in order to prevent a breakdown of both federal
and state systems of criminal justice. Judges, however, can en-
courage this process through their influence as members of the le-
gal community. Occasional decisions that slightly modify the law
so as to eliminate sources of friction between state and federal law
officers also may be helpful. In the main, however, the judiciary
has the minor role of adhering to rules of etiquette that permit
and correctional agencies need it to select proper correctional programs.
FmNAL REP., supra note 74, at 67. The task force did not actually recommend the creation of
a national data base, however, because alternative systems for making such information
available are already being tested. Id. at 69.
81 Hopkins, supra note 83, at 674.
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members of the two judicial establishments to cooperate with a
minimum of annoyance and interference and a maximum sense of
pleasure in jointly serving the bar and public.
As Professor Winkle observes:
The state-federal judicial council experiment is instructive
for courts and federalism. It suggests in part that the intergovern-
mental process best achieves goals, at least modest ones, through
cooperation, not competition. Separatism, isolation, and noncom-
munication undermine interjudicial harmony. Within a frame-
work of interdependence, there is a distinct need to understand
and to accommodate the federal and state interests whenever pos-
sible .... [A] complete view of judicial federalism cannot be con-
fined to statutory rules and judicial decrees alone. The interplay
of individual actors is a necessary dimension of that
relationship."8
Joint training sessions, invitations to each other's conferences and
the State-Federal Judicial Council can assist in improving the abil-
ity of state and federal judges to provide the public with more ef-
fective justice. At the same time, it must be emphasized that "Our
Federalism"8 " and a sensitivity to intrusion on state courts' inter-
est in enforcing state laws, should not impede the prompt vindica-
tion of federal constitutional rights by simple and economical
procedures.
s8 Winkle, supra note 31, at 252.
89 Charles Alan Wright defines "Our Federalism" as the doctrine "which teaches that
federal courts must refrain from hearing constitutional challenges to state action under cer-
tain circumstances in which federal action is regarded as an improper intrusion on the right
of a state to enforce its laws in its own courts." C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 52A, at 229.
Justice Black referred to "Our Federalism" as:
[T]he concept... represent[ing] ... a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten
that this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union
of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
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